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Abstract
The LHC cryogenics network will be briefly recalled,
showing the built-in fallback solutions in case of failure
of some main components or utilities. Indications of the
estimated corresponding downtime or transition phase will
be listed, including specificities like the cold compressors.
On the basis of the delivery sequence compatible with the
latest schedule, the commissioning phases will be
described, from refrigeration capacity production, QRL
tests to full sector tests and circulation of beams. The
safety aspects related to cryogenic tests and interaction
with beam operation will be particularly emphasised.
After presenting the intended team structure for
commissioning and foreseen control system, some
remaining open points toward nominal LHC operation
will be addressed.
1  DESCRIPTION OF THE LHC
CRYOGENIC ARCHITECTURE
The cooling capacity [1] will be provided by eight
cryoplants, each one composed of a 1.8 K refrigeration
unit (QSCC-QURC) [2] coupled to a 4.5 K refrigerator
(QSCA/B-QSRA/B-QURA) [3]. Whenever possible, this
equipment is grouped at the even points as shown on
figure 1 and 2. The interconnecting boxes (QUI) allow for
crossed-connections aiming at limiting the effect of
possible down-time of one of the refrigerators. This is not
possible at Point 2 for which the cooling capacity can
only be fed from one single cryoplant.
For LEP, the rapidly changing dynamic heat loads of
the superconducting cavities were directly compensated by
electrical heaters. This resulted in pseudo-steady operation
of the cryogenic system. For LHC, the time constants of
the main dynamic heat loads (current leads with respect to
beam energy and beam screen w.r.t to beam intensity)
should allow automatic adaptation of the cooling capacity
to the needs, thus providing significant savings on power
consumption.
2  POSSIBLE FAILURES AND THEIR
EFFECTS
The analysis is made first for entire systems such as
refrigerators and after for some of their constituents such
as rotating parts, valves and instrumentation.
2.1  Failure of a system
The complete failure of a refrigerator could be qualified
as “unlikely to occur during the life-cycle, but possible”.
Valves interconnecting circuits in the QUI will allow
distributing the cooling power of the remaining
refrigerator to both sectors, but only to run LHC in the
“low intensity” mode. Physics could be authorised
some 12 hours after the refrigerator failure, if one want to
keep some time for diagnostics and return to nominal
operation. If wanted, it should be possible to switch
automatically and authorise physics in some 3 hours but
always in the “low intensity mode”.
A failure of the common parts such as the
interconnecting box or the distribution line (QRL) would
mainly originate from a loss of isolating vacuum, and
could be qualified as “ improbable, with a probability of
failure occurrence which cannot be distinguished from
zero”. In such a case, the cooling capacity could not be























Figure 1: Cryoplants around the LHC
Figure 2: Typical LHC cryogenic architecture
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2.2  Failure of a component
The 4.5 K refrigerator cycles are based on rotating
machinery associated in parallel, thus being relatively
robust to individual failures. For the compressors, the
former LEP refrigerators will provide one spare machine
per stage. Point 1.8 being equipped with a new
refrigerator, space has been foreseen for possible spare
compressors. As concerns the turbines, they are all
necessary only to reach the “ultimate” mode. For these
machines, any single failure would be compatible with
the “nominal” mode.
The 1.8 K refrigeration units could be compared with
sophisticated ventilators with at least five rotating
machines arranged in series. Any single failure would
result in a system failure described before. One should
note the specificity of the cold centrifugal compressors for
which specific tuning will be required to cope with
hydrodynamic conditions at the wheels.
For each sector of the distribution line, some two
hundred valves or heaters will be installed with about
three quarters of them without redundancy and about one
thousand instruments will be used mostly for
information. It is clear that statistically, some access will
be necessary for adjustments. All efforts are made to keep
such interventions as small as possible.
3  RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH
HELIUM IN THE TUNNEL
On the contrary to other superconducting accelerators,
all magnet quench valves are collected (no safety valves
will discharge to the tunnel), nitrogen is not distributed
underground and there are no force-flow circulators.
Therefore, the only cause of helium discharge would come
from the rupture of a pipe leading to local reduction of
oxygen concentration. Some experimental validations are
going on [4]. The necessary equipment as well as
associated procedures have not yet been approved by the
LHC TCC.
4  COMMISSIONING AND CONTROL
SYSTEM
The commissioning of the cryogenic system will
mostly take place in underground caverns during 2001-
2004. After the complete installation of the QRL in a
sector, it will be tested using cold helium gas (no liquid)
with relatively low density and low mass flow rates
reducing such the possible helium to be discharged to
unnoticeable amounts. Once accepted, a mechanical plug
will be installed at the QUI level preventing any helium
to circulate in the tunnel piping. This plug will only be
removed when all magnets will have been installed and
the sector be ready for commissioning.
During installation, specific protections should be
provided for all sensitive parts such as jumper
connections, valves, control racks…
Once at cold conditions, access should only be granted
when the current in the magnets has been reduced to a
value corresponding to less than 10% of the stored energy,
and with procedures to be validated.
The control hardware will be interconnected with an
ethernet-based network allowing remote control. Up to the
first sector test, it is intended to operate the cryogenic
system with a reduced team completed by all experts of
sub-systems. For LHC, the present industrial contract for
operation and maintenance could be renewed to mostly
take care of the production and distribution of cooling
capacity. It is clear that some CERN specialists will have
close contacts with PCR-based teams in order to check
and anticipate any coupling between beam behaviour and
cryogenics [5].
5  CONCLUSION
The availability of cooling capacity at “low intensities”
should not be a problem, provided that:
•  The operating requirements are close to the design
considerations
•  There are no strict limits on power consumption
•  The time for initial tuning will have been granted.
At higher intensities, some coupling between the beam
and the cryogenic system could occur, or maybe a bit
earlier!
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